CONTESTING DIGITAL DARWINISM
Dan Goodman, PhD.
Presented at West Virginia University's 21st Annual Colloquium
on Literature and Film
As far back as 1989, Herbert Schiller warned:
Stunning corporate mergers and acquisitions among telephone, computer, and entertainment companies, each of them already dominant in their field, are preparing the way for an unprecedented corporate enclosure of national and social space (234).
Lest anyone think Shiller an alarmist, consider the implications
of the 1996 Telecommunications Omnibus Bill, which flattens the
barriers to mergers and aquisitions, makes deregulation the engine
that drives the digital network, and makes only meager provisions
for public access. This sellout of the public interest, which
locks trickle-down logic into law, was barely reported, let alone
contested.
Indeed, the Telecommunications Bill, ominous as it is, merely
ratifies a tectonic shift in the global economy, one that began
in the early 80s with digital computer networks and the concomitant
deregulation of the telecommunications and finance sectors. The
shift is towards a more flexible "cybernetic" capitalism
(Robbins and Webster) whose central nervous system is the digital
network. Granted, this convergence is no seamless monolith; still,
it is a storm system gathering intensity in the face of weak opposition--a
self augmenting system whereby capital commands both the representational
terrain and the actually existing infrastructure. This convergence
raises two crucial questions for those in cultural studies: How
does a shift register in the cultural sphere? How can we contest
the battle over representations that is thus far dominated by
capital?
What are the chief characteristics of cybernetic capitalism? Transnational
corporations have become planned economies with vast internal
markets within which raw materials, products, informational services,
and funds continually circulate. Advanced telecommunications networks
are the glue that binds these disparate enterprises and drives
transnationals to extend their reach. The network is both the
means and the rationale for an intensive restructuring of corporate
capital. Command of the telecommunications pipeline confers strategic
advantage, including greatly increased control over remote production
and internal operations even down to the keystroke; aggressive
restructuring of the workforce; wider scope to exploit transfer
pricing and currency fluctuations. Pipeline command allows corporations
to target consumers down to the fine grain of individual preference;
it gives corporations the leverage with which to whipsaw localities
desperate to retain them. The scramble for pipeline is further
exacerbated by deregulation of the twin sectors: financial deregulation
underwrites the massive investments in pipeline, which accelerates,
in turn, the transaction velocity of capital, spurring the creation
of increasingly sophisticated financial instruments, which spurs
further investment in the pipeline--and so the vortex intensifies.
The ripple effect of this tectonic shift is felt in the fine grain
of personal transactions. For example, surface-level concern about
invasion of personal privacy does not begin to touch on the subtlety
and scope of commercial (or consumer) surveillance based on transaction-generated
data. As opposed to the more active collecting of data by control
agencies, there exists a more passive gathering of transaction-generated
data in which any electronically mediated activity yields information
that is fed into databases. The Internet, being bi-directional,
is a revenue bonanza that stimulates consumption while extracting
consumer data--all of which seriously curtails our freedom to
work the Internet. Think of yourself as being shadowed by you
transaction-generated double, where every Internet transaction
leaves a trace that can be fed into the database where your double
is subject to analysis. Now imagine this double growing by increments
every time you pass through an electronic gateway. Indeed, when
one considers how little of the surveillance iceberg is visible
to the public, one feels how heavily the burden of representation
weighs against those who would contest the corporate enclosure
of public space.
Consider, too, the impending eclipse of the original, text-centered
Internet (that is, newsgroups, bulletin boards, IRC, etc.) in
favor of the Web. Those who have visited the "old neighborhood"
lately know how badly it has deteriorated. The ratio of "spam"
to substantive postings has increased, while the number of moderated
newsgroups has decreased. Many of the livelier fringe sites are
now vacant shells that survive only to steer traffic onto the
Web, which is draining the life from the Internet like a mall
drains the life from downtown. The bandwidth-intensive Web siphons
off the Net's best resources and fosters the erroneous impression
that the Internet was merely its primitive precursor. Such digital
Darwinism runs roughshod over those who value the openness, accessibility,
and true interactivity of the original system over the more tightly
monitored, consumption-driven and segregated Web. The Web is not
simply an advance over the Net; it is a more managed, less participatory
regime where the drive for image consumption supplants language
play.
Cybernetic capitalism has produced a deep asymmetry whereby transnationals impose their presence on the Internet and extend their reach into our lives while reserving the power and prerogatives of private pipelines for themselves. The proliferation of private networks makes the global system less a Macluhanesque village than a series of separate and competing nervous systems overseeing flow of goods, people, and money at one remove from the public gaze.